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19.1 Three Dilemmas of Conventional Computer
Models
Building Theories is the central aim of empirical science and the computer is a
valuable supporting tool for doing this. On the one hand, existing theories can
be modelled precisely in form of computer programs, on the other hand theories
and explanation facilities can develop from modelling empirical data by and by.
Beyond traditional empirical methods, computer simulation is regarded more
and more as the second pillar of empirical science and key technology for the
next decades.
However, the powerful theoretical potential of computers contrasts to their
factual use in the empirical sciences. Empirical scientists view computers mostly
as number crunchers doing arithmetical operations on figures. Especially in the
humanities and social sciences the dilemma arises. that most theories exist in
verbal form and cannot be translated into numerical, conventional models as
used by natural scientists (for example differential equations).
The first and most important problem with social science computer mod-
elling therefore is, that social science knowledge often has qualitative, non-
numerical form, which cannot be described by numerical algorithms of tradi-
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tional programming techniques. For example, in the social sciences there are
typically qualitative relations like:
- if x then y
- if x then not y
- the bigger x the bigger y.
Conventional modelling demands specifying these relations in exact, quantified
terms. This means either to state social science knowledge "precisely", but
in an artificial and brute force manner or thus not to be able to apply it to
computer programs. This is the first and most important dilemma of social
science knowledge in the frame of numerical modelling.
A second problem with conventional computer models is that theoretical
knowledge often is hidden in non-theoretical code. In every model there has to
be code elements for program control, for user interface, for reading data and so
on. These parts have no relation to the theoretical knowledge. In conventional
programs a strictly separation of domain specific knowledge and other program
elements is to carry out very difficult. The reason is that in conventional
programming methods a strict defined interface between domain specific and
non domain specific parts is lacking. Various authors, e.g. Frijda [1967], have
emphasized that this partition in computer programs is very difficult to obtain.
Boden [1984] refers to a third problem of conventional models: She writes,
that the reasoning - or rather the calculation - behind the conclusions generated
by these numerical models is commonly opaque to an but the mathematical
initiate. This makes it very difficult for politicians and the general public to
produce sensible critiques of the inferences and assumptions involved, or even
to understand such critiques when produced by other social scientists.
19.2 AI based modelling
In the eighties a few sociologists, social psychologists and anthropologists
have discoverd the power of Artificial Intelligence (AI) for avoiding or solving
these problems (for example Brent 1986; Sylvan and Glassner 1985; Read
and Behrens 1989; for an overview and general introduction: Benfer et al.
1991). AI offers concepts, techniques and tools to reduce the three dilemmas
and leads to a lot of additional advantages. The general AI-modelling view is
the view of computers as symbol processing machines doing operations on any
symbol. The key term is the concept of knowledge representation. Knowledge
418 19 Artificial Intelligence Modelling: Data Driven and Theory Driven ...
representation means the formal representation of qualitative, semantic, non-
numerical information. For modelling uses, knowledge representation has three
dimensions:
I. knowledge representation as abstract concept means formalisms like logic
or higher order structures such as semantic nets, frames or scripts (for an
overview see e.g. [Rich 1983D. In our context, especially first order
logic is a very important representation formalism because nearly any
qualitative theory can be translated into this formalism [Kowalski 1979J.
2. declarative programming tools and techniques for implementing knowl-
edge on a concrete machine like Lisp [Winston and Horn 1981], Prolog
[Clocksin and Mellish 1984J or higher order tools, for example hybrid
systems.
3. knowledge based systems or expert systems as a possible architecture
with well-known features and advantages (e.g. Waterman 1986; Merritt
1989).
The focus of my interest is knowledge based systems. Knowledge based
systems or expert systems are computer programs, which represent and pro-
cess the knowledge of a human expert. In these expert systems knowledge is
explicitly coded, mostly in form of facts and if-then-rules. Since rules are the
dominant formalism for representing expert knowledge, these programs are also
called rule based systems.
The architecture ofa rule based system consists at least of three parts [Merritt
1989J:
I. a knowledge or data-base which contains the qualitative data of a certain
knowledge domain;
2. an inference engine to deduce new knowledge from the old one;
3. an explanation part, which shows the user, which facts and rules was
used for deduction. The explanation part makes the action and internal
structure of the system transparent.
The relation between scientific theories and knowledge based systems is as
follows: knowledge based systems represent the domain-specific knowledge of
human experts. Qualitative theories also contain domain-specific knowledge
and scientists, working with a theory, can be regarded as experts on this theory.
Therefore, knowledge based programs are the preferable form of computer
models to represent these qualitative theories. In this case, we talk of knowledge
based models. Thus, a knowledge or rule based model is a computer program,
which represents some aspects of a real system or a theory in symbolic, rule
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form. The knowledge base contains the social science knowledge and the
inference engine deduces new facts from the old one. A fully implemented
expert system can even explain, how these facts are deduced, e.g. which rules
are used for deduction. This type of symbolic programs expands social science
modelling in a decisive manner and releases it from the straitjacket of traditional
modelling concepts. The following points emphasize important solutions for
the above mentioned dilemmas.
• Symbolic, non-numerical representation of knowledge
In expert systems, there is no need for quantification and no need for
the usage of numerical concepts. In view of the specific form of social
science theories, this modelling concept offers a wide area of applications.
The most important motivation for the use of knowledged based models
was therefore the possibility to formalize and explicate verbal theories
which are beyond quantitative mathematical modelling. For Brent [1986]
the greatest appeal of these programs is their claim to be applicable to
problems not having tractable solutions based on mathematical reasoning.
• Separating domain specific code from other program elements
The architecture of a knowledge based system implies a clear separation
of the domain-specific knowledge from other program elements. Re-
garding modelling, this partition corresponds to a division of theoretical
knowledge from other parts of the programs serving as control, interface
et cetera. Thus, it can be definitely determined which program elements
represent theoretical parts.
• Modularity and flexibility
The consequence of this strict separation is a high degree of modularity
and flexibility of the theoretical part. This means, that pieces of knowl-
edge or modules simply can be added to the existing theoretical knowledge
by adding rules, without changing other parts of the progam. In the same
manner, pieces of the model can be modified or deleted easily by modi-
fying or deleting certain rules. This has a very positive influence on the
experimental character of computer modelling and theory construction.
• Explanation facilities
Knowledge based systems have the ability to explain their reasoning.
Computer models, which are able to explain their behavior, are impor-
tant for validation, because the rules and assumptions can be shown and
criticized. The expert system reasoning can be used for proofing the cor-
rectness of deductions or for showing the solution path. In general, better
insights into the functioning of the model are possible. This reduces the
accusation that computer models are opaque.
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• Explication of logical features
Automated inferencing in knowledge based models can eliminate the
pitfalls of intuitive reasoning and flaws of verbal theory building. These
flaws stem primarily from the limits on the processing capacity of the
human brain like the small short term memory or various biases that
may distort the inference process. For example, theories may hinge on
the researcher's values, information is processed selectively, "desirable"
conclusions are more easily drawn. Contrary to the intuitive, brain-
based inferencing, computer-based inferencing can be made reliable and
reproducible. In contrast to human scientists, knowledge based systems
can deduce complete and correct conclusions from a big mass of data.
This means concretely: The set of all valid propositions can be derived
from given premises. The consistency of a theory can be proven by
deriving no contradictions. The soundness of postulated conclusions can
be shown. New hypotheses can be derived.
For Brent [1986], the expert system may playa role analogously to that of
a good research assistant, checking the logic of the researcher, tracing out im-
plications of changing an assumption, answering questions about its reasoning,
and identifying the source of particular bits of knowledge. Of course, an AI
approach has not only advantages but has also some difficulties and problems.
For example, converting verbal model descriptions into symbolic terms is far
from easy in general. In practice, the implementation of professional expert
systems is often supported by a special "knowledge engineer" who transforms
the verbal and vague expert knowledge to formal if-then-rules. Further, in com-
plex problems it can be difficult to follow the reasoning of an expert system, so
the user can be confused in the same way as in traditional models.
19.3 Theory driven AI-modelling
There are two fundamental ways to use AI-modelling for theory building. So far,
a view of computer modelling was implicitly presented, which Herbert Simon
calls theory driven science. Theory driven science means, that the starting
position is an existing theory which should be represented in some or all aspects
in form of a symbolic model. In one word: one tries to transform a theory to
a runable program. If one is successful, the program represents the theory or
parts of it more or less. In a pure theory driven approach, empirical data are not
significant.
Why should we make computer programs out of theories? We should do
this, because there are some decisive advantages to have a theory modelled
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in form of a program, some mentioned above. To give only a few further
key words: formalization, executability, experimental power, teaching. One
of the most important reasons for modelling a theory is scientific discovery:
in the theory driven approach, this means for example, the discovery of new
theoretical conclusions, gaps, or inconsistencies. However, while theory driven
science in traditional modelling was restricted to a high degree to numerical
concepts, the knowledge based approach frees social science modelling from
these restrictions. The knowledge based approach implies a valuable, more
flexible and more applicable instrument of theory driven modelling. Let's
illustrate the theory driven approach with a few concrete examples.
A very early, but prototypical example is GulIahorn and GulIahorn's [1963]
computer model of Homans' interaction theory. GulIahorn and GulIahorn trans-
lated Homans not in expert system form, but into a qualitative computer program
using IPL-V, an early Lisp-like language. One could say, that the program rep-
resents Homans theory to a big part.
In the eighties, a lot of modelIers rely explicitly on the knowledge based
paradigm. Each of the folIowing programs exemplifies important advantages
and aims of the theory driven approach.
Sylvan and Glassner [1985] translated theoretical assertions of Simmel's
"Conflict and the web of group affiliations" into a rule-based program consisting
of223 rules. They used the program to determine whether the theory is internalIy
contradictory and whether the central tennet of Simmel's work - the conflict-
cohesion hypothesis - can be deduced. It was shown, that the verbal assumptions
of Simmel were not sufficient to deduce the hypothesis.
Brent [1986] describes a Prolog program which uses Goffman's dramatur-
gical framework to analyze various examples of social interaction. Goffman's
model represents a kind of sociological knowledge which has resisted attempts
at formalization with mathematical models. These programs, so Brent, may one
day be used as teaching tools to acquaint students with particular theoretical
perspectives, and as aids to assist in refining and extending social theories.
The research group of Michael Masuch (Center for Computer Science in
Organization and Management, Amsterdam) translated various theories from
organizational sociology to first order logic and if-then-rules. Using a theorem
prover for deductions it was feasible to draw all possible inferences from the
theory's assumptions. Glory et ai. [1990] clarified the structure of Mintzberg's
contingency theory and encountered some terminological problems at various
points during the formalization process. Another example by Peli et ai. [1994]
is the logic translation of organizational ecology by Michael Hannan and John
Freeman. The application of a theorem prover demonstrated, that the chosen
part was consistent - with one provision. Further, a set of new theorems were
discovered and some postulated conclusions could not be deduced from the
assumptions.
422 19 Artificial Intelligence Modelling: Data Driven and Theory Driven ...
It should be clear that these four examples represent a pure theory driven
approach. All models start with explicitly existing theories and translate the-
oretical assumptions to qualitative program statements, partly discovering new
and unknown theoretical and logical features. In all of these studies empirical
data were not relevant.
19.4 Data driven AI-modelling
The counterpart of a top-down perspective is a bottom-up perspective: the data
driven approach. In contrast to the theory driven procedure data driven science
starts vice versa with empirical data or the input-output behavior of the real
system without an explicitly given theory. The modeller tries to write a computer
program which generates the underlying empirical data or input-output(i-o)-
behavior of the system. Typically, models are produced in a generate-and-test-
procedure. Generate-and-test means writing program code which tries to model
the i-o-behavior of the real system first of all roughly. Using the generated code
one tests the i-o-behavior and improves it as long as the i-a-behavior doesn't
correspond to the real system.
The data driven approach is very popular in cognitive modelling, for example
in modelling problem solving processes. Langley, Simon and others [1987,
p. 33] give a short abstract of this procedure: "We can write in an information
processing language - a symbolic rather than numerical language - a computer
program that describes, say, the processes that intelligent adults are hypothesized
to use in solving some class of problems. We can then present the program and
some human subjects with identical problems and compare their behaviors.
From the computer we will obtain a trace, from the human subjects a verbal and
written protocol of their behavior while they were solving the problems. We
can then test the program - our theory of the behavior - by comparing the trace
with the protocol, just as any theory is tested by comparing the system path it
predicts with data showing the actual path".
As the quotation shows, the goal of this approach is the discovery of mech-
anisms, of hypotheses or a theory, which describes the underlying phenomena.
Permanent model improving and fitting will lead to more adequate models which
fit the empirical system better and better. It will give insights into the complex
empirical system and thus theoretical structures can develop. In my opinion, the
data driven modelling is at least as useful as the theory driven approach. The
reason is, that our existing, empirical confirmed theories can not be better than
the best theories which come to our mind. Efforts to improve the conditions
of theqry building in the social sciences will therefore lead to better empirical
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confirmed theories [Glory et al. 1990, p. 81). Knowledge based data driven
models will improve these conditions in a decisive and fruitful manner.
The Teamwork project by Doran [1985) can serve as the first simulation
example for this approach. Teamwork is intended to permit the study of task
planning and task execution and of the mechanisms of cooperation and commu-
nication between actors. Its aim is to use the study of this modelled multi-actor
system to further understandings of real systems - "both those that might be
constructed and those that are in existence around us". As far as can be seen,
Doran doesn't use an explicitly given theory but he tries to model empirical
phenomena by generating computer behavior, which corresponds to empirical
data.
Banerjee [1986] uses a Prolog program to explain the development of social
structures. For explaining social structures he uses the scheme concept from AI
and cognitive psychology. He argues that social structures endure only when
the preferences and judgments of participants prompt them to act in ways that
reinforce the preferences and judgments of other participants. When actions
of each set of participants reinforced the preferences and judgments of others,
that particular social structure tended to reproduce itself and to be stable over
time. This program can be regarded as an example where theoretical structures
are developed from data and - as Benfer et al. [1991, p. 26] say - as "use of
artificial intelligence programming strategies where the AI program becomes
the theory itself".
The expression "development of theoretical structures from data driven
computer programs" has a precise equivalent in Artificial Intelligence. Under
the label "machine learning", computers are programmed to discover empirical
laws from data [Langley et al. 1987; Slezak 1989]. For example, given the
rough data by Robert Boyle, one program is reported to have no difficulty
finding the law relating gas pressure and volume. A well-known family of
these discovery models are the Bacon programs. Their results are published in
papers like "Rediscovery Chemistry with the Bacon System" or "Rediscovering
Physics with Bacon 3" [Langley 1979]. Bacon 3 is a knowledge based system
using a few simple heuristics to solve a broad range of tasks. The rules detect
constancies and trends in data and lead to the formulation of hypotheses. Bacon
3 has shown its generality by rediscovering versions of the ideal gas law, Kepler's
third law, Coulomb's law, Ohm's law and more. The discovering procedures
are not limited to quantitative laws. For example, Glauber discovers qualitative
regularities in chemistry.
By the way, these programs demonstrate that apparently there exists a logic
of inductive reasoning - in contrast to what Popper says. In any case, for the
social sciences the careful hypothesis can be stated: inductive learning programs
could be implemented for the discovery of regularities in social science data too.
However, these systems must be able to handle statistical laws. A first beginning
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is maybe Garson's paper "The role of inductive expert system generators in the
social science research process" [Garson 1987]. Garson successfully applies a
classification and rule generating algorithm to historical data matrices.
Until now, the concepts of theory driven and data driven science were
introduced as ideal cases. However, in practice the dividing line between theory
driven and data driven approaches is often not as clear as it seems here but more
fuzzy or mixed. For example, one can build-in (parts of) a theory in a data
driven procedure or vice versa or one can go back and forth from theory to data
and so on.
19.5 A mixed approach: discovery of theoretical
explanations for group processes
In this last section, an example of the author's work is given. It's an instance for
a mixed approach, where the procedure is the following: starting with a model
of a rather vague theory, the consequences of the model inputs were investigated.
The computational data, which were produced by this model, were compared
to empirical data. To make a better fit, the model was changed, run again and
started up again. In this back and forth procedure the goal was to discover new
und specific hypotheses and explanations for empirical phenomena which the
theory dealt with.
The modelling object was a micro-sociological structural theory: the tran-
sitivity model by Holland and Leinhardt [1971]. Generalizing Heider's balance
theory, the transitivity model deals with interpersonal relations in small groups,
especially friendship choices. The central claim is that relations in these groups
become more transitive over time and - as a consequence -lead to a hierarchical
structuring of cliques. Transitivity tendency means, that if x is a friend of y
and y is a friend of z then - on the long run - x will also become a friend of
z. Fig. 19.1 is an example of a potential friendship network, represented by a
graph structure. The nodes represent actors, and the arrows (or arcs) "directed
relations" between the actors. Interpreted as a friendship network, the arc point-
ing between a and b means, that a is a friend of b. Fig. 19.1 is an intransitive
structure, because transitivity does not hold for all members of this network.
For example, k is a friend of hand h a friend of f, but k is not a friend of f
as the transitivity rule requires. Note, the elements of a sub-graph, in which
all metpbers choose all other members, are called cliques. Thus, {a, b, c} and
{j,g, h} are,two cliques.
The transitive graph model was confirmed by a lot of studies (for example
Davis 1970; Hallinan 1974). In the original model however, there is a gap of how
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Figure 19.1. An example of an intransitive network structure
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these graphs become more transitive and why. Although the theory is supported
by empirical data, it gives no explanation for the development of transitive
structures. Further, the empirical content of the theory is very low. Hummell
and Sodeur [1987] for example have criticized that there are no mechanisms
that could explain the emergence, development, stabilization and changing of
transitive structures. Opp [1984] criticizes the low empirical content of the
theory, which means, that the development of more transitive structures is truly
predicted, but these structures can be realized in a lot of alternatives. There
is no prediction, how the transitivity tendency will be developing concretely.
However, the more the number of alternatives, the lower the content of a theory.
In a computational approach, an attempt was made, to detect and investi-
gate interesting theoretical hypotheses, which should explain the development
of transitivity in friendship choices and should increase the empirical content.
This was done by changing from theory to data and vice versa. These kind of
computer experiments can precede and support empirical research because they
can clarify the hypotheses and discover formal and substantial interesting fea-
tures of a theory. For example, some assumptions are maybe not very sensible,
while others can be interesting candidates for empirical investigations. Thus,
computer experiments can be an important kind of formalized and controlled
thought experiments, which support empirical research.
A Prolog program was written that firstly represents the essential concepts
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of the theory in the architecture of an expert system. It has the ability to ex-
plain its reasoning and to trace the chains of reasoning. Secondly, step by step
procedures were implemented, which transformed intransitive networks into
transitive structures. Logically, these procedures are equivalent to a specializa-
tion of the qualitative Holland and Leinhardt law of transitivity tendency. The
structural consequences of these procedures were observed and compared to
empirical data. If the produced consequences did not fit the qualitative data,
they were varied to make a better fit.
Formally, there are two fundamental ways to increase transitivity in an
intransitive structure. Assume, r(x, y) and r(y, z) are two existing relations in
a (friendship) database but r(x, z) is missing - in contrast to the requirement of
the transitivity rule. A first approach for generating more transitivity is simply
to add the relation r(x, z) to the knowledge base (Add-Rule). Thus, transitivity
could be generated by checking all triples (x, y, z) and adding r(x, z) whenever
r(x, y) and r(y, z) does hold. A second approach is to delete one of the relations
r(x, y) or r(y, z) in the data base. In this case, the if-part of the transitivity rule
does not apply and the rule is not violated. Thus, "vacuous" transitivity could be
generated by checking all triples (x, y, z) and delete r(x, y) orr(y, z), whenever
these two relations are in the data base, but r(x, z) is not included (Delete-Rule).
Note: in both cases the changing (adding or deleting) ofa relation has a potential
effect on the transitivity of other triples.
These two basic procedures are very primitive, but can serve as potential
starting position. First, the Add-Rule seems to be the one which es empirically
preferred the most. In real group processes, transitivity is "resolved through
transitive closure rather than through the development of vacuous transitivity"
[Holland and Leinhardt 1971, p. 123]. Second, we assume cliques as a starting
position for the correction process, because in these sub-groups the cohesion is
extremely strong - compared to actors which are not clique members. Thus, the
"transitivity pressure" is stronger in cliques than in non-clique-members.
By pressing the "run-button" with this specification of the Add-Rule, the
simulation generated transitive structures. However, these structures did not fit
the empirical data. Using different data sets in many runs, cliques were unified
when making intransitive networks more transitive. For example, the separated
cliques {a, b, c} and {d, e, J} in an intransitive starting network, can be unified
to the clique {a, b, c, d, e, J} in the generated transitive structure. A closer look
shows that cliques are combined whenever there are cycles between cliques. A
cycle between clique A and clique B is a directed path from a clique member
of A to a clique member of B and back again to A. The pooling of cliques,
however, is an unacceptable fact because empirically this doesn't occur.
The data implied that the transitivity mechanism should be refined. Thus,
the constraint was added so not to pool existing cliques. This implied, not
only adding relations, but removing relations, as the union of the cliques was
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Figure 19.2. The model generated transitive structure of the intransitive graph in Fig. 19.1
threatened. Further, the data suggested, that the transitivity machine should start
with cliques of high status order. A clique Cl has a higher status than a clique
C2 if and only if more actors voted for the members of C 1 than for the members
of C2 - or graph theoretical: if more arcs point at C I than at C2. In this manner,
the generation of a set of theoretical interesting procedures was continued which
had as a consequence transitive structures. These procedures fit the empirical
data better and better. Fig. 19.2 shows a generated transitive structure using the
data of Fig. 19.1. As a result, a hierarchical transitive structure was produced
with two cliques {a, b, c, d, e} and {g, h, J}. Clique {g, h, J} has a very low
status, whereas clique {a, b, c, d, e} has a very high status. Note: for every
member of the network the transitivity rule holds. The so-produced transitivity
mechanism has powerful explanation facilities for important group processes.
They can serve as structural explanations for dynamic clique development.
In detail, the computer based transitivity model generates and explains the
following tendencies:
(a) Destroying of existing cliques
Although cliques are very cohesive sub-structures and will usually not be
destroyed in the specialized model too, in some cases they are disbanded.
On the way to more transitivity, cliques will be destroyed if and only if
two or more cliques are connected via co-cliqual nodes. A co-cliqual
node is an actor, who is a member of at least two cliques. Which clique
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will be destroyed depends on the status of the clique. For example, in the
four 2-cliques in Fig. 19.3 two of them are disbanded and only the cliques
with the highest status stay alive.
(b) Integrating new members into existing cliques
On the way to more transitivity, cliques will expand their number of
members, if the non-members are connected to these cliques by cycles.
For example, in the intransitive graph of Fig. 19.1 the non-clique-actors d
and e are joined with the clique {a, b, c} by a cyclus (e.g. e - a - c - e or
d - c - e - d). By making this graph more transitive, there is a tendency
of integrating d and e to the clique, and this dynamic process is finished
in a complete transitive graph.
(c) Emergence of new cliques
On the way to more transitivity, cliques will emerge from those actors,
who are connected via cycles. Every cycle in an intransitive graph will be
completed to a clique in a transitive graph. Thus, the cycle on the left side
of Fig. 19.4 will become a clique in a transitive structure. Metaphorically
speaking, the cycle is the "egg cell" for the emergence of cliques when
using the structure model of the transitive graph.
Figure 19.3. Chains of cliques will be destroyed when the graph becomes transitive.







Figure 19.4. A cycle in an intransitve structure (left side) will be completed to a clique in a
transitive structure (right side).
].....--.-'l:
The experiments with the computer program indicate a very important role
for cycles in the transitivity theory and in the explanation of group processes.
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A cycle is a critical graph theoretical concept in this model and a sensitive
theoretical feature of the Holland-Leinhardt theory.
To summarize, the following steps were carried out:
I. Some logical possibilities, how graphs become more transitive, were
implemented in rule-form;
2. Regarding empirical data, these transitivity rules were modified and made
"empirically more adequate";
3. The result was a transitivity rule which could explain a number ofdynamic
group processes such as clique developing, clique expanding and clique
destroying.
The discovered mechanisms are not inductively reasoned directly by the pro-
gram, but by experimenting with the program. They can be viewed as research
hypotheses, which are candidates for empirical investigation.1
19.6 Conclusion
In general, AI-techniques can both be used for investigating and improving
existing theories and for generating new and better theories from empirical data.
AI can support the process of scientific development analogously like some
formal aids in mathematical modelling are doing. A lot of authors emphasize
AI-modelling as being much more significant in cultural and social studies than,
for example, modelling by mathematical equations. An extreme position states
that AI will take the same role in the social sciences which mathematics had
in the physical sciences: "Artificial Intelligence will ultimately come to play
the role vis-a-vis the psychological and social sciences that mathematics, from
the seventeenth century on, has done for the physical sciences" [Allport 1980,
p.31].
Although we have argued for AI in this paper, we do not share a too uncritical
enthusiasm. In fact, many researchers also deny a significant role that AI
plays in the social sciences. Additionally, there are a lot of problems for
applying AI and expert system techniques to social theories. Thus, a good
strategy is a moderate optimism. In our view, AI is not a revolution - as
Allport's proposition suggests - but rather an evolution in the development of
new modelling techniques. Beyond some very useful parts of mathematics,
I By the way. eliminating the knowledge base - i.e. facts and rules of the Holland-Leinhardt-
theory - the program can be used as an expert system shell for implementing other theories.
For further details see Manhart [1995].
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statistics and traditional computer modelling, AI is one new tool to formalize
and state more precisely social science knowledge. We will do best, if we select
from the modelling tool box those instruments which are most adequate for our
purposes. Presumably, AI will at least playa significant and essential role in
the competition of modelling tools in the future.
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